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Abstract: This study investigates the association between cross-listed directors at multiple boards of 
directors and the choice of audit firm in emerging market economy such as Republic of Macedonia. 
The study involved all listed companies and companies with special reporting obligations at 
Macedonian Stock Exchange owned domestically, since appointment of auditors for subsidiary 
companies is influenced dominantly by parent company decision making process. Determinants of 
auditor selection are important input for overall assessment of auditor independence and audit quality 
and provide valuable argument for revised regulations in order to improve credibility of audit of 
financial statements. There is limited research available regarding the close relationship and ties 
between management and auditors, especially in the case of small audit markets where the potential 
impact of cross-listed directorship on auditor independence and audit quality is considerable. The 
results of the study provide little evidence of significant relationship between cross-listed directorship 
and the choice of auditor in respect of Macedonian listed entities. The findings will be of interest for 
public accounting firms in developing their strategies for close inter-relationships with those charged 
with governance. It is intended to help regulators assess the impacts of interpersonal relations to 
auditor independence and quality of assurance services provided to the general public, as well as 
improvement of monitoring function on behalf of shareholders. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines the connection between cases of cross-listed directors at 
multiple board of directors and audit firm links. Potential links of such nature are 
important as they can influence both auditors’ independence and audit quality 
(Davison et al., 1984; Jubb 1999). The motivation for our study of cross-listed 
directorship and auditor links has been inspired by the importance of auditors’ 
independence and little research available in relation to auditors’ independence in 
South-East Europe. In addition, when it comes to the close ties and links between 
directors and auditors little evidence of research, if any, could be found in respect 
of small audit services markets, such as the audit market in Republic of Macedonia. 
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It has been argued that inappropriate competitive strategies such as low-balling or 
decreased services quality could prevail on small professional services markets. 
Our motivation for the study was to identify whether close links and ties between 
board member and auditors exist and compare the results with previous research 
conducted on large audit markets. 
Cross-listed directorship occurs when one or more directors of one company sit on 
the board of another company or companies. This paper provides analysis of 
instances of the same director being linked to the same auditor across more than 
one company, as an indication of close ties and relationship between board 
members and auditors impacting auditors’ independence.  
Cross-listed directorship or interlocking directorates are long-standing phenomena 
with many implications for all economies. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that 
multiple directorships encourage greater monitoring of corporate decisions on 
behalf of all shareholders. This is because directors involved have significant 
investment in establishing reputation as decision experts. Since interlocked 
directors are most likely to be outside directors, it is argued here that systematic 
links by these directors with the same auditor present a potential conflict of 
interest. They have the potential to compromise audit independence and degrade 
the effectiveness of audit to serve as monitoring function for shareholders.  
Flint (1988) provides evidence that long-term relationship between auditors and 
clients may cause the auditors to start expressing strong loyalty or emotional 
connection with their clients, which could result in decreased auditor 
independence. This means that the quality of audit work completed and overall 
auditors’ competence to decline resulting in subjective, unjustified judgments made 
when evaluating audit evidence. 
In order to maintain the credibility of the audit function and protect auditors from 
lengthy and costly litigations, the auditing profession and regulators in various 
jurisdictions prescribe special requirements designed to limit personal relationship 
between auditors and clients. In the case of the Republic of Macedonia, in 
accordance with the Auditing Law audit, engagement partners rotate every 7 years, 
for bank holding companies the statutory audit firm rotates every 5 years. 
Nevertheless, rotation of engagement partners can’t be considered as proficient 
measure to break close auditor-client ties and secure auditors’ independence. 
Therefore, we have included only non-financial entities in our sample companies 
and reviewed membership at their board of directors as well as appointed auditors. 
The paper proceeds with previous literature on interlocking directorates and 
auditors’ choice provided in section 2, section 3 and 4 present the research method 
applied and results obtained, while section 5 presents the conclusion and 
implications for future research. 
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2.  Literature Review 
Primary paper addressing the issue of cross-listed directors and selection of 
auditors is the work of Davison et al., (1984) whose analysis have shown 
significant relationship between the number of director interlocks and the 
probability that these interlocked companies are audited by the same auditor. 
Seabright, et al., (1992) investigated the effect of attachment of individuals 
primarily responsible for the auditor-client exchange on the likelihood of auditor 
switching. The results of this study suggest that auditor-client relationship relies 
largely on personal knowledge and trust and these forbid clients to consider an 
audit firm change. 
Jubb (2000) examines auditor choice from this people factor perspective. The study 
controls for alternative explanations for auditor choice and finds the existence of 
shared directors (multiple-board external directors) has a systematic and significant 
measurable effect on auditor choice. The analysis covered various locations in 
Australia, across different specialist levels and between big 5 and non-big five 
audit firms. An additional motivation behind selecting an auditor goes to what has 
been referred as the “insurance hypothesis” or the “deep pockets” syndrome. 
Internationally affiliated audit firms with substantial resources and insurance 
coverage are expected to be able to make significant payments in the event of audit 
failure.    
Many explanations have been offered for the existence of interlocking directorates 
covering a range of theoretical prescriptions. These perspectives have included 
transaction costs (Williamson, 1991), agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989) and class 
theories (Koenig and Gogel, 1981). However, the most relevant explanation for 
their existence, in terms of the context relevant to this study, is that they serve to 
reduce or control uncertainty in business environments (Allen, 1974; Schoorman et 
al., 1981; Mizruchi, 1996). Allen (1974) specifies three main ways in which 
interlocking directorates attempt to reduce environmental uncertainty. These are (1) 
by the exchange of information and expertise between companies; (2) by providing 
a stable means of communication and liaison between companies; and (3) by 
advising management concerning the relationship of the company to its external 
environment. 
Unlike other products or services, the quality of an audit is not readily discernible. 
It cannot be judged from the outside and must be experienced to be evaluated 
(Pennings et al., 1998; Craswell and Francis, 1999). Interlocking directors holding 
multiple board positions are in one of the best positions to judge the relative quality 
of audits due to their experience with various service providers. Their experience 
gives them the ability to advise on and perhaps contribute to selection of the most 
appropriate auditor for companies on whose boards they sit. Sharing this 
ŒCONOMICA 
 
 79 
knowledge with boards of other companies on which they sit reduces the costs of 
evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of potential auditors. 
However, auditor independence is of primal interest in order to provide credibility 
to general purpose financial statements for various users and stakeholders, which is 
the main reason for existence and development of the auditing profession. 
Therefore, the significant impact of interlocking directorates to auditor’s choice is 
important factor influencing relative independence of auditors and  the objectivity 
in making professional judgments while completing audit assignments.   
In respect of the approach and results of previous research, we formulate the Ho 
hypothesis as follows: 
“Ho: The frequency of common director-auditor links is not associated directly 
with the frequency of interlocking directorates.” 
 
3. Methodology 
The empirical study elaborated in this paper covers all firms listed on the official 
market of Macedonian Stock Exchange and publicly held companies with special 
reporting obligations, total of 101 companies as of July 2011. For 17 companies 
there were no exact or updated data on Board membership or appointed audit firm 
and were not taken into account. Also, another 26 companies were not included in 
the sample due to foreign ownership, since their audit decision can be affected by 
their foreign connection (Baydoun, 1999). The final sample consisted 58 
companies audited by 15 different audit firms. Previous studies have classified 
accounting firms in three main groups: big-four, second tier and local accounting 
firms. The motive why this classification is made lies in the distinction in quality of 
performance that researchers make between big-four and international firms on one 
side and local accounting firms on the other (DeFond, 1992). Only 3 firms (5%) of 
the companies included in the sample were audited in 2010 by big-four audit firm, 
19 (33%) by second-tier international firm and the rest by local firms. This result 
oppose the results of other research made in other countries were the majority of 
listed companies are audited by big-four auditor or second tier international firm. 
The reasons for such market conditions are not further explored and do not 
represent the interest of this paper. 
Publicly available information with the Securities and Exchange Commission on 
composure of board of directors and appointed auditors at general shareholders 
meetings was used in order to prepare table 1 and 2.  
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4. Results 
In order to examine the relationship between cross-directorship and auditor choice, 
two contingency tables were constructed. The contingency table 1 shows the 
distribution frequencies for selection made by companies with and without cross 
listed directors for each audit firm. All companies were audited by 15 audit firms, 
including international second tier and big four auditors. Since the expected 
frequencies for the table showing clients per each audit firms are very low Fisher 
exact test of independence and Chi Square-Yates corrected tests are used to test the 
Ho hypothesis.  
In this case the results of both Fisher exact test and Chi Square-Yates test lead to 
the conclusion that Ho hypothesis can’t be rejected at the 5% significance level. 
This means that there is no significant association between the cross-directorship 
and the choice of same auditors for companies whose shares are traded at the 
Macedonian Stock Exchange.   
Table 1. Cross-listed directors and selection of each audit firm 
 
Auditor 
Companies 
with cross-
listed director % 
Companies
without 
cross-listed 
director % Total 
PWC 1 1,72% 0 0,00% 1 
B & Q 7 12,07% 5 8,62% 12 
Bend  3 5,17% 0 0,00% 3 
Grant Thornton 8 13,79% 2 3,45% 10 
Deloitte 1 1,72% 0 0,00% 1 
Dimitrov 1 1,72% 3 5,17% 4 
E.R.C 2 3,45% 0 0,00% 2 
Kojzakliev 
Pavleska 1 1,72% 0 0,00% 1 
KPMG 1 1,72% 0 0,00% 1 
MSR  1 1,72% 0 0,00% 1 
Moore Stevens 4 6,90% 5 8,62% 9 
Pelagoniska  4 6,90% 0 0,00% 4 
Rafajlovski 0 0,00% 4 6,90% 4 
Revizor 
Babamov 2 3,45% 0 0,00% 2 
Trio Consulting 3 5,17% 0 0,00% 3 
  39   19   58 
Statistics: Chi-Square Yates; df=14, value=10.893, P=0.694 
Fisher exact test; P-value=1, α=0.05    
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In order to be certain with the results another contingency table 2 has been 
prepared which shows frequency distribution for two groups of audit firms, 
international (containing second tier and big four) and local.  
Table 2. Cross-listed directors and selection of international and domestic audit firms 
Auditor 
With cross-
listed director % 
Without 
cross-listed 
director % Total 
International 
Firms  15 25,86% 7 12,07% 22 
Domestic 24 41,38% 12 20,69% 36 
  39   19   58 
Statistics: Chi-Square; df=1, value=0.014, P=0.905 
 
5. Conclusion 
From the results presented it can be concluded that the links between companies 
with same audit firm can’t be sufficiently explained with cross listed directors 
present in their board of directors.  The evidence provided in this paper support the 
conclusion that audit quality and auditor independence is not questioned by factors 
such as cross listed directors and ties with audit firm partners when Macedonian 
companies are in question. Although, there were cases in the sampled companies 
with cross listed directors where those companies were audited by the same 
auditor, such cases are incidence and couldn’t support our assumption of 
significant association between analyzed variables.  
The results of the study provide useful insight into corporate governance structures 
and practices in Republic of Macedonia, since auditors’ independence and audit 
quality are important instance of good corporate governance. By being independent 
of board members auditors in Republic of Macedonia are able to effectively 
perform annual audit assignments and non-executive board members monitor 
organizational performance. However, this research paper does not provide 
conclusive evidence in respect of overall independence of auditors in Republic of 
Macedonia, since other factors such as audit fees, rotation practices, quality control 
and overall audit regulatory framework are not taken into consideration.   
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